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Abstract
The empirical relationship between trade protection and economic growth is surprisingly
fragile, as shown in a number of other papers. After demonstrating this empirical
sensitivity, we address one possible explanation for these ﬁndings: that the relationship
is nonlinear. Following the endogenous growth literature, we test for the possibility
that the relationship between trade barriers and growth is contingent on measures of
comparative advantage. The ﬁndings suggest that these nonlinearities do in fact exist
— in particular, the correlation between tariﬀs and growth is strongest and positive for
capital-abundant countries — and are robust to the choice of control variables.
JEL Codes: F13, F43, O19, and O24
Keywords: Comparative advantage, economic growth, tariﬀs, total factor productivity.
∗J. Minier (corresponding author), University of Kentucky, 335 Gatton Building, Lexington KY 40506-
0034; e-mail: jminier@uky.edu. B. Unel: Department of Economics, Louisiana State University; Baton
Rouge, LA 70803-6302; e-mail: bunel@lsu.edu. We would like to thank Chris Bollinger, Josh Ederington, Rob
Reed, Andreas Savvides, Athanasios Vamvakidis, and participants at the 2008 Southern Growth Conference
at the SEA meetings for helpful comments and discussion. Any errors are ours alone.1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief, among economists, policy makers, and the general public, that
more open economies grow faster than closed economies. Many international organizations
emphasize this correlation; for example, the World Trade Organization proclaims on its
website that it has “helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing
to unprecedented growth.”1 Among economists, Anne Krueger is representative in stating
that, “trade liberalization oﬀers the only known way to escape from the ever-slowing growth
rates of developing countries.”2
However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Supporting the positive correlation between
openness and growth, Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrate a strong, positive relationship
between growth and a variable they construct to indicate an “open” economy. Using an
instrumental variables approach based on geographical factors, Frankel and Romer (1999)
ﬁnd a large, positive (although not strongly statistically signiﬁcant) correlation between
trade openness and growth. Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) use “identiﬁcation through
heteroskedasticity” and ﬁnd that openness has a positive, but small, eﬀect on growth, con-
trolling for the positive eﬀect of growth on openness. Edwards (1998) shows a consistently
positive relationship between growth and nine measures of openness. Harrison (1996) ﬁnds
a positive relationship between a number of measures of openness and growth in a panel
study of developing countries. In a sample of 81 industrialized and developing countries,
Lee (1993) ﬁnds that trade distortions (tariﬀs and black market premia) lower both the
growth rate and the investment rate.
Anecdotal evidence, such as the frequently cited comparison between the outward-
oriented, fast-growing East Asian economies and the stagnating Latin American economies
focused on import substitution strategies, also supports the belief that trade protection and
growth are negatively related. However, a number of papers have cast doubts on the strength
1“The WTO in Brief,” http://www.wto.org
2Krueger (1998).
1of this relationship. In their classic sensitivity analysis of growth regressions, Levine and
Renelt (1992) fail to ﬁnd a robust relationship between growth and any trade or interna-
tional price-distortion variable (although a positive correlation between the trade-output
ratio and the investment ratio is one of their few robust ﬁndings). Vamvakidis (2002) ﬁnds
no evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and growth prior to the 1970s.
In a study of ten countries over the period 1860-1913, O’Rourke (2000) ﬁnds that tariﬀs
and growth were positively correlated. Similarly, Clemens and Williamson (2002) demon-
strate that the high tariﬀ barriers of pre-1914 Latin America were accompanied by rapid
subsequent growth, while low tariﬀs and low growth prevailed in Asia during this period.
Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright (1997) ﬁnd a negative relationship between trade liberal-
ization and economic growth in a panel study of 76 developing countries in the post-1985
period.3
Papers such as Harrison and Hanson (1999), Clemens and Williamson (2004), and
Rodr´ ıguez and Rodrik (2000) demonstrate directly a lack of robustness in the relationship
between trade policy and growth. Harrison and Hanson (1999) demonstrate the fragility
of previous empirical results that rely on the Sachs and Warner (1995) index of openness,
concluding that the diﬃculty in establishing a link between trade reform and growth is due
largely to the lack of good objective data on trade policies across countries. Clemens and
Williamson (2004) demonstrate a positive relationship between tariﬀs and growth prior to
World War II; the relationship reverses during the post-War period. Rodr´ ıguez and Ro-
drik (2000) conduct an extensive critical review of some of the more widely cited papers—
primarily Sachs and Warner (1995), Dollar (1992), Ben-David (1993), and Edwards (1998)—
that have shown an empirical link between less trade protection and faster growth. They
conclude that this link has not been convincingly demonstrated, and they remain “skeptical
that there is a strong negative relationship in the data between trade barriers and economic
3With a similar panel data set, Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright (1998) ﬁnd evidence of a positive
relationship between liberalization/openness and growth, although the relationship is fairly modest and
occurs with a lag; this further illustrates the point that the relationship is not robust.
2growth, at least for levels of trade restrictions observed in practice” (p. 316).
In general, the empirical growth literature has downplayed trade variables in its work.
For example, the variable most closely related to trade in Barro (1991) is the purchasing-
power-adjusted investment deﬂator. Levine and Renelt (1992) cite trade policy as an exam-
ple of a variable frequently omitted entirely from growth studies. Many empirical growth
studies have included measures of terms-of-trade shocks to proxy for changing international
conditions, following Barro and Lee (1994), although these shocks are not intended as prox-
ies for openness.
Perhaps it is not surprising that empirical work has failed to identify a strong negative
correlation between trade protection and growth, because theory does not generally provide
an unambiguously negative relationship. For example, in the neoclassical Solow model,
trade policy has no eﬀect on steady-state growth. In addition, in endogenous growth models
in open-economy frameworks, the relationship between trade policy and growth is frequently
a contingent one; in Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992), among others,
the eﬀect of trade barriers on growth depends on the pattern of comparative advantage
across countries.
Despite this, empirical examinations of the relationship between trade and growth have
until recently allowed only for linear relationships. A notable exception is DeJong and
Ripoll (2006), who investigate the relationship between tariﬀs and growth and its contin-
gency on income levels. In a panel of 60 countries, they ﬁnd that the negative correlation
between tariﬀs and growth holds only among higher-income countries. A second exception
is Papageorgiou (2002), in which trade openness is a threshold variable separating coun-
tries into distinct growth regimes; however, openness is not directly included in his growth
speciﬁcation, but operates indirectly, as a separating variable.
The focus of this paper is somewhat diﬀerent. First, much of the theoretical motivation
for considering nonlinearities is based on the idea that trade protection may direct factors
of production into more or less productive sectors, depending on the pattern of comparative
3advantage. We investigate the eﬀect on total factor productivity (TFP) growth as well as
the eﬀect on growth in income per worker.
Unlike DeJong and Ripoll (2006), who focus primarily on income as the source of the
contingent relationship, we follow the endogenous growth literature and also allow for the
possibility that the relationship between trade barriers and growth is contingent on the
pattern of comparative advantage.4 Relying on the pattern of comparative advantage,
rather than income, as the source of diﬀerences in the correlation between growth and
tariﬀs is closer to the predictions of endogenous growth models, although we do include
income levels in some speciﬁcations as an additional control variable. We also examine a
longer time period (a 20-year cross-section, instead of 5-year dynamic panels). Since the
pattern of comparative advantage is unlikely to change much over short periods of time (but
the timing of business cycle ﬂuctuations across countries may be aﬀected by the pattern of
comparative advantage), we think that examining the correlation over a longer period of
time is more likely to uncover how the relationship between trade protection and growth
varies according to comparative advantage. Unlike Papageorgiou (2002), we focus on the
potential nonlinearity of the direct relationship between trade barriers and growth. We
ﬁnd evidence that such nonlinearities do, in fact, exist, in that the relationship between
tariﬀs and growth is contingent on the pattern of comparative advantage, and this eﬀect is
stronger than the contingency based directly on income. Our results provide some support
for the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1990), in that tariﬀs are positively correlated
with growth in countries with a comparative advantage in manufactured goods.
Our paper is also related to Nunn and Treﬂer (2009), who examine the relationship
between the skill bias of a country’s tariﬀ structure (the degree to which tariﬀs favor the
country’s skill-intensive industries) and economic growth. We focus on how the correla-
tion between overall tariﬀs and growth varies across countries with diﬀerent patterns of
comparative advantage.
4As a robustness check, DeJong and Ripoll (2006) do include the ratio of the tariﬀ on primary goods to
the tariﬀ on manufactured goods, although they do not include measures of the composition of trade itself.
4In what follows, section 2 demonstrates the sensitivity of conventional regressions of tariﬀ
protection on growth. In section 3, we discuss theoretical reasons to suspect a nonlinear
relationship between trade protection and growth. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis
allowing for nonlinearities in the relationship between tariﬀ protection and growth, and we
conclude in section 5.
2 Trade Barriers and Growth: Conventional Empirics
The question addressed in this paper is whether countries with lower barriers to international
trade have higher growth rates, controlling for other country characteristics. Despite the
conventional wisdom that such a correlation exists, it does not generally appear in the
data. To illustrate this, Table 1 presents conventional growth regressions over the period
1980-2000 that include a measure of average tariﬀs (import duties as a percentage of import
value) as an explanatory variable. In Regression 1, the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs (averaged over
the period 1975-90) is positive but not statistically signiﬁcant; in Regression 2, a tariﬀ
squared term is included. Although the magnitude of the standard errors suggests that one
should not put too much weight on the point estimates themselves, the estimates indicate
that the correlation between tariﬀs and growth is negative until tariﬀs (as a percentage of
import value) reach a level of approximately 12% (this includes 49 observations, or 54% of
the sample); at higher values of tariﬀs, the correlation is positive. However, as in Regression
1, both the linear and the squared term are statistically insigniﬁcant. These results are not
atypical, as simple measures of tariﬀ barriers rarely enter signiﬁcantly into standard growth
regressions.
Because of such statistically insigniﬁcant results, many researchers have concluded that
average tariﬀs, despite being an obvious and direct measure of trade restrictions, are an in-
appropriate measure of trade policy. For example, it is well known that simple calculations
of (import-weighted) average tariﬀs tend to underestimate the “protectiveness” of trade
policy, since import volume tends to be lower in industries with high tariﬀs. In response,
5Table 1: Standard Growth Regressions
(1) (2)
τ 0.074 (0.032)∗∗ 0.084 (0.078)
τ2 -0.030 (0.203)
lny0 -0.006 (0.003)∗ -0.005 (0.003)∗
lnh0 0.000 (0.010) 0.000 (0.010)
Inv/GDP 0.124 (0.037)∗∗∗ 0.124 (0.037)∗∗∗
Pop growth -1.056 (0.256)∗∗∗ -1.066 (0.270)∗∗∗
Openness 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
constant 0.048 (0.033) 0.048 (0.035)
Adj. R2 0.296 0.288
Notes: There are 94 observations and the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of GDP
per worker between 1980 and 2000. τ is the average tariﬀ rate over 1975-90, lny0 is log GDP per worker
in 1980, and lnh0 is the log average human capital in 1980. Inv/GDP, pop growth, and openness cover
the period 1975-90. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.
∗∗∗ indicates
statistical signiﬁcance at 99%;
∗∗ at 95%; and
∗ at 90%. See Appendix A for data deﬁnitions and sources.
many researchers have constructed other measures of trade policy. Perhaps the most inﬂu-
ential has been the “openness” measure used in Sachs and Warner (1995), which classiﬁes a
country as “open” if it meets all ﬁve of the following criteria: (a) average tariﬀs below 40%;
(b) average non-tariﬀ barriers on capital and intermediate goods below 40%; (c) average
black market premium below 20%; (d) no export marketing board; and (e) not a socialist
economy. However, in their critique of this literature, Rodr´ ıguez and Rodrik (2000) ﬁnd no
reason to discard average tariﬀs as a useful measure of trade policy, pointing out that no
paper documents a serious bias in tariﬀs as a measure of trade policy, or establishes that
an alternative measure performs better. In addition, less direct measures of openness have
the disadvantage of conﬂating measures of trade restrictions with additional variables (such
as the extent of free markets or ﬁnancial liberalization) that are not necessarily related to
trade policy but are correlated with growth. We ﬁnd the Rodr´ ıguez and Rodrik (2000)
argument that average tariﬀs are a reasonable measure of trade restrictiveness persuasive,
and so use average tariﬀs as the measure of trade barriers in this paper.
63 Theoretical Background
A large body of work links openness to growth. Two centuries ago, Adam Smith observed
that the specialization allowed by trade leads to increased productivity. Indeed, there is a
standard presumption on the part of economists that lower trade restrictions will lead to
increased incomes and higher growth. This is based primarily on the well-known result that
in static models of trade, free trade is the ﬁrst-best policy. Thus, most trade economists
expect an unambiguous, negative relationship between trade barriers and long-run growth.
However, this presumption is incomplete. For example, if one assumes a standard Solow
growth model with diminishing marginal returns and exogenous technological progress, then
trade barriers have no eﬀect on the steady-state rate of growth. It is true that episodes of
trade liberalization, which increase a country’s level of real GDP, can increase growth in the
short run as the economy transitions to a new higher steady-state level of output (also see the
empirical evidence presented in the introduction to this paper). However, even these positive
short-run eﬀects come with caveats as, in the presence of market failures or externalities,
trade liberalization could also potentially reduce output, negatively aﬀecting growth in the
short-run. Thus, neither standard static welfare models nor conventional economic growth
models provide an unambiguous prediction of a negative correlation between trade barriers
and long-run growth.
This raises the question of whether such an unambiguous relationship can be found in the
endogenous growth literature. Again, the answer is no. Speciﬁcally, in models of endogenous
growth, where growth is generated through factor accumulation or endogenous technological
change, the eﬀect of trade barriers on growth is contingent on country characteristics. This
contingent relationship can be illustrated by considering two standard citations: Grossman
and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992). Both papers model the eﬀects of trade on
endogenous growth in a small country with no cross-border knowledge spillovers.5
5For empirical evidence on this, see Keller (2002), who ﬁnds that the beneﬁts from technology spillovers
decline with distance, and concludes that technology is substantially local. An implication, of course, is that
technology depends more on domestic R&D than on global R&D.
7Matsuyama (1992) presents an endogenous growth model in which a single factor of
production, labor, is used to produce two goods: a primary good and a manufactured ﬁnal
good. Knowledge accumulation occurs in the manufacturing sector through learning-by-
doing that is external to individual ﬁrms but internal to the manufacturing sector as a
whole, so that innovation in the economy is a function of the size of the manufacturing
industry. A direct implication of this framework is that trade, which reduces the size of the
manufacturing sector in countries with a comparative advantage in primary goods produc-
tion, could potentially reduce the rate of knowledge accumulation (and hence growth). In
contrast, in countries with a comparative disadvantage in primary goods production, trade
results in an expansion of the manufacturing sector as resources ﬂow to the exporting side
of the economy. Thus, countries that specialize in manufacturing will see a corresponding
increase in the rate of knowledge accumulation, and therefore an increase in growth, due to
trade.
Alternatively, Grossman and Helpman (1990) assume that technological innovation oc-
curs not through learning-by-doing in a manufactured ﬁnal good sector, but rather through
research and development in a non-traded intermediate input sector. Speciﬁcally, Gross-
man and Helpman (1990) assume two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labor,
which are used in three sectors: a primary goods sector, a manufacturing sector and a
(non-traded) intermediate input sector. Human capital in this framework can be used to
produce either in the manufacturing sector or to perform R&D in the intermediate input
sector. As in Matsuyama (1992), trade causes resources to ﬂow into the manufacturing sec-
tor in those countries which have a comparative disadvantage in primary goods production
(i.e., the skilled-labor abundant countries). However, in contrast to Matsuyama (1992), this
resource reallocation will reduce the rate of technological innovation as it pulls resources
(i.e., skilled labor) out of the R&D sector. Likewise, trade increases the rate of R&D in
countries that specialize in primary goods production as skilled labor is freed up to move
to the intermediate input sector.
8There are several lessons that can be drawn from the endogenous growth literature.
First, as Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992) illustrate, small changes
in the underlying assumptions of the model can result in drastically diﬀerent conclusions.
Thus, rather than attempting a precise structural estimation of any particular model, we
follow the conventional growth literature by running reduced-form growth regressions to
investigate possible correlations between tariﬀ barriers and GDP growth.
Second, as can be seen in these two examples, the eﬀects of trade barriers on growth
depend crucially on how trade reallocates resources in the economy. However, the eﬀect of
trade on resource allocation also depends fundamentally on a country’s particular pattern
of comparative advantage. The direct implication of this is that one should look for a
contingent relationship between trade barriers and growth when analyzing cross-country
data. Thus, in Section 4, we examine whether the correlation between growth and tariﬀs
varies depending on the levels of variables that proxy for a country’s pattern of comparative
advantage.
4 Empirical Setting and Results
Following Hall and Jones (1999), among others, we assume that output in country i is
produced according to:
Yi(t) = Ki(t)α [Ai(t)Hi(t)]
1−α , (1)
where Ki and Hi represent stocks of physical and human capital, and Ai is the level of total
factor productivity (TFP). The stock of human capital is given by Hi = hiLi where hi is
the average human capital per worker and Li is the number of workers used in production.
The data on output (GDP) and the labor force are taken from Penn World Tables mark
6.1. Physical capital stocks are constructed by using the standard perpetual inventory
method with a six percent depreciation rate. The average human capital per worker is
given by hi = eφ(Ei), where Ei denotes years of schooling and φ(E) represents the eﬃciency
of a unit of labor with E years of education. The data on average years of schooling for the
9population aged 25 and above are taken from Barro and Lee (2002); and following Klenow
and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2005), we assume that φ(Ei) = 0.085Ei and α = 1/3.6 The appendix
provides a more complete description of the data.
An obvious problem with investigating potential nonlinearities in the relationship be-
tween tariﬀ barriers and growth is that the number of potential model speciﬁcations is
nearly inﬁnite while the available data are much more limited. Thus, in this paper, we
concentrate on incorporating interaction terms into conventional growth regressions to al-
low the marginal eﬀect of tariﬀ barriers on growth to diﬀer across countries. Based on
the endogenous growth literature, this marginal eﬀect should be diﬀerent in countries with
diﬀerent patterns of comparative advantage. We extend the conventional growth regression
literature by estimating the following speciﬁcation:
gi = βττi + βτzτi · Zi + βxXi + εi, (2)
where gi denotes the average annual growth in GDP per worker over the period 1980–2000,
τi is the average tariﬀ rate over 1975–90, Zi includes variables that proxy for country i’s
initial pattern of comparative advantage, and Xi is a set of country characteristics that we
will introduce as we use them. Most control variables cover the period 1975–90;7 initial
values are measured in 1980.
We consider three variables that may aﬀect the marginal correlation between tariﬀs
and growth. First, the pattern of comparative advantage in a country is fundamentally
a function of the relative abundance of various resources. Thus, we consider capital per
worker and skill intensity as two potential Z variables. Skill intensity is measured by the
fraction of the population that completed at least secondary school.8 The assumption is
6Allowing the rate of return φ
0(E) to diminish with years of schooling E, as in Hall and Jones (1999),
does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results.
7We consider the period 1975–90 to partly control for endogeneity. However, our results are quite robust
to using alternative periods (e.g., 1980–2000) for those control variables.
8Skill intensity can also be deﬁned as the ratio of the country’s skilled workers (those that completed
at least secondary school) to unskilled workers (those with at most some secondary school). Because for a
few advanced countries this alternative measure of skill intensity well exceeds 1, using the above measure
10Table 2: Effect of Tariffs on Growth of GDP per Worker
Variables (1) (2) (3)
τ -0.152 (0.173) -0.278 (0.164)∗ -0.399 (0.177)∗∗
τ × skill0 -0.044 (0.383) -0.129 (0.385) -0.106 (0.338)
τ × lnk0 0.035 (0.020)∗ 0.042 (0.020)∗∗ 0.053 (0.021)∗∗
τ × pexp0 -0.129 (0.080) -0.066 (0.085) -0.041 (0.075)
skill0 0.005 (0.019) -0.014 (0.019) -0.021 (0.020)
lnk0 -0.019 (0.007)∗∗∗ -0.018 (0.006)∗∗∗ -0.019 (0.005)∗∗∗
pexp0 -0.008 (0.008) -0.003 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010)
lny0 0.008 (0.006) 0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.006)
Inv/GDP 0.169 (0.037)∗∗∗ 0.113 (0.033)∗∗∗ 0.092 (0.037)∗∗∗
lnh0 0.013 (0.019) 0.030 (0.022) 0.017 (0.021)
Pop growth -1.057 (0.265)∗∗∗ -0.875 (0.355)∗∗ -0.495 (0.326)
Openness 0.005 (0.004) 0.008 (0.004)∗∗ 0.006 (0.005)
Geography no yes yes
Governance no no yes
Adjusted ¯ R2 0.465 0.557 0.593
βτ +
P
βτz 0.091 (0.038)∗∗ 0.061 (0.041) 0.066 (0.037)∗
Notes: There are 85 observations and the dependent variable is the growth in output per worker 1980–2000.
Here x0 represents 1980 value of variable x. Skill is measured as the fraction of population who completed
at least secondary school. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, and
∗∗∗,
∗∗, and
∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively. The last row
gives the marginal eﬀect of tariﬀs evaluated at the means of skill (0.147), capital (9.641), and primary
exports (0.668).
that countries endowed with diﬀerent levels of resources will exhibit diﬀerent patterns of
comparative advantage, and thus have diﬀerent marginal tariﬀ eﬀects. As a ﬁnal proxy
variable, we use the percentage of exports that are primary goods as a direct means of
proxying for comparative advantage in primary, rather than manufactured, goods.
We present the results of this regression in Table 2. Regression 1 follows a traditional
growth speciﬁcation, including initial log output per worker, investment, human capital, av-
erage population growth rate, and openness (total trade/total output) as control variables.9
The variables of interest, of course, are our measures of comparative advantage — capital,
skill intensity, and primary exports — interacted with tariﬀs. Since interaction terms like
of skill intensity reduces the inﬂuence of these observations. However, our results are not sensitive to using
the alternative measure of skill intensity.
9Excluding population growth rate and openness from the regressions does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our
results.
11Table 3: Marginal Effects - Interaction Terms
Value Marginal eﬀect (s.e.) p-value
min: lnk80=5.08 -0.174 (0.092) 0.063
Q25: lnk80=8.41 0.001 (0.039) 0.981
Q50: lnk80=9.75 0.071 (0.037) 0.059
Q75: lnk80=10.91 0.132 (0.050) 0.010
max: lnk80=11.95 0.187 (0.066) 0.006
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are the calculated eﬀect from Regression 3 of Table 2 of the combined linear
and interaction terms, estimated at the values of capital per worker given in the ﬁrst column (minimum,
maximum, and quartiles), given that primary exports and skill are at their mean values (0.147 and 0.668
respectively). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
these can pick up the correlation between the dependent variable and the components of
the interaction term, we also include skill, capital, and primary exports entered linearly.10
Regression 2 adds four geography variables from Sachs and Warner (1995), and Regres-
sion 3 includes these geography variables and six measures of the quality of governance
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) (see Appendix for their descriptions). In
Regression 3, the most fully speciﬁed model, the coeﬃcient on tariﬀs entered linearly is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the marginal eﬀect of tariﬀs on
growth estimated at the means of skill intensity, capital per worker, and primary exports is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient estimate
on the capital stock interacted with tariﬀs is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, even with
the capital stock entered linearly into the regression (the coeﬃcient on the capital stock is
also statistically signiﬁcant).
Table 3 presents the marginal eﬀects of tariﬀs on growth as the level of the capital
stock varies, estimated from Regression 3 of Table 2. For computing the marginal eﬀects
as the capital stock varies, we assume that skill intensity and primary exports are at their
mean values of 0.147 and 0.668 respectively. At higher levels of capital per worker, the
correlation between average tariﬀ rates and economic growth is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. The correlation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for 46 of the 85 countries
10We present results including both the log of initial human capital and skill intensity. Results do not
change signiﬁcantly if we drop either human capital or skill intensity.
12Table 4: Key Results including Income Interaction
Panel A: Coeﬃcient estimates
τ -0.103 (0.286)
τ × K/Y 0.078 (0.035)∗∗






Panel B: Marginal eﬀects
Marginal eﬀect (s.e.) p-value
min: K/Y=0.17 -0.059 (0.061) 0.342
Q25 K/Y=1.11 0.014 (0.040) 0.726
Q50 K/Y=1.54 0.047 (0.037) 0.200
Q75 K/Y=2.61 0.131 (0.052) 0.015
max K/Y=3.48 0.198 (0.077) 0.013
Notes: All other variables from Regression 3 of Table 2 are also included. Results do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
if we use ln(K/Y ). Marginal eﬀects are the calculated eﬀect from the regression of the combined linear
and interaction terms, estimated at the values of capital per worker given in the ﬁrst column (minimum,
maximum, and quartiles), given that primary exports, income per worker, and skill are at their mean values
(0.147, 9.26, and 0.668 respectively). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
in the sample (54%). At low levels of capital per worker, the relationship becomes negative,
although the estimated marginal eﬀect is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for only one
country in the sample. To interpret the magnitude of these coeﬃcient estimates, note that
an increase of one standard deviation (0.081) of tariﬀs would translate into a predicted
increase in growth of 0.00008 at the 25th percentile of capital per worker (log capital per
worker equal to 8.41); at the 75th percentile (log capital per worker equal to 10.91), the
prediction would be an increase of 0.011.11
Thus, the results of Table 2 indicate a clear relationship between a country’s pattern of
comparative advantage and the marginal eﬀect of tariﬀ barriers on growth. This relationship
is consistent with the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1990): tariﬀ barriers are
positively correlated with growth among capital-abundant countries.
Although capital intensity more closely parallels the spirit of the endogenous growth
theories discussed in Section 3, we ran a supplementary regression including initial log in-
11In the sample, the mean (log) growth rate is 0.008, with a standard deviation of 0.019.
13come per worker interacted with tariﬀs as a comparison to DeJong and Ripoll (2006). In
panel data over ﬁve-year periods, DeJong and Ripoll (2006) found that the correlation be-
tween tariﬀs and growth was contingent on the level of income. Including an interaction
term between income and tariﬀs does not change the quantitative or qualitative results of
Table 2, as seen in Table 4; the coeﬃcient estimate on the interaction term between tariﬀs
and capital remains statistically signiﬁcant and positive, while the coeﬃcient on the income
interaction term is not statistically signiﬁcant. The regression in Table 4 includes the addi-
tional variables in Regression 3 of Table 2, but only the key results are presented.12 Panel B
of Table 4 includes the marginal eﬀects when the income interaction term is included; these
are analogous to the results in Table 3, and are qualitatively very similar. To summarize,
the results in Table 4 suggest that the relationship between tariﬀs and growth depends more
strongly on the level of capital than on the level of income.
It should be noted that a positive correlation between tariﬀ barriers and growth does
not necessarily imply that protection is optimal from a welfare standpoint. As Grossman
and Helpman (1990) take pains to note, even though under certain circumstances trade may
lead to a decline in the rate of innovation in their framework, a country can still beneﬁt
from engaging in trade. Speciﬁcally, in their model, international trade provides both the
standard static eﬃciency gains from specialization as well as the opportunity to consume
diﬀerentiated goods from abroad. Thus, the above results should not be treated as a positive
statement about the desirability of trade protection, but rather as a normative statement
about the observed correlation between tariﬀ barriers and output growth.
Table 5 presents results when the dependent variable is TFP growth. The analysis
based on TFP growth is important, because in the endogenous growth models discussed in
Section 3, the mechanism through which tariﬀs aﬀect growth is by reallocating resources to
more (or less) productive sectors of the economy. According to Regression 3 in Table 5, the
12In Table 4, we use the capital-output ratio instead of capital per worker as our measure of capital,
because the correlation between output per worker and capital per worker is over 0.95. Results in Table 2
are robust to using K/Y instead of capital per worker.
14Table 5: Effect of Tariffs on TFP Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3)
τ -0.148 (0.220) -0.281 (0.197) -0.439 (0.216)∗∗
τ × skill0 -0.049 (0.458) -0.168 (0.433) -0.101 (0.406)
τ × lnk0 0.031 (0.024) 0.041 (0.023)∗ 0.056 (0.025)∗∗
τ × pexp0 -0.052 (0.096) -0.010 (0.099) 0.010 (0.093)
skill0 0.010 (0.020) -0.013 (0.022) -0.025 (0.025)
lnk0 -0.002 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.010 (0.005)∗
pexp0 -0.016 (0.01)∗ -0.006 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011)
lntfp0 -0.013 (0.004)∗∗∗ -0.014 (0.005)∗∗∗ -0.015 (0.005)∗∗∗
lnh0 0.011 (0.021) 0.028 (0.023) 0.015 (0.022)
Pop growth -1.151 (0.310)∗∗∗ -1.022 (0.396)∗∗ -0.586 (0.398)
Openness 0.009 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.007 (0.005)
Geography no yes yes
Governance no no yes
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.453 0.488
βτ +
P
βτz 0.106 (0.046)∗∗ 0.080 (0.048)∗ 0.090 (0.044)∗
Notes: There are 85 observations and the dependent variable is the TFP growth 1980–2000. Here x0
represents 1980 value of variable x. Skill is measured as the fraction of population who completed at least




∗ represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level respectively. The last row gives the
marginal eﬀect of tariﬀs evaluated at the means of skill (0.147), capital (9.64), and primary exports (0.668).
direct correlation between trade barriers and TFP growth is negative. However, the results
in this regression also indicate that a country’s pattern of comparative advantage aﬀects
the marginal eﬀect of tariﬀ barriers on TFP growth.
Table 6 gives marginal eﬀects from the productivity regressions of tariﬀs on TFP growth,
computed from Regression 3 of Table 5. Although the correlation again starts out negative
at low levels of capital per worker, the negative correlation is never statistically signiﬁcant.
The correlation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for 57 of the 85 countries in the
sample (67%).
5 Concluding Remarks
The motivation behind this paper lies in the confusing and contradictory literature con-
cerning the impact of trade on growth. Despite years of study and numerous empirical
attempts, researchers have been unable to establish an unambiguous negative correlation
15Table 6: Marginal Effects - Interaction Terms
Value Marginal eﬀect (s.e.) p-value
min: lnk80=5.08 -0.164 (0.117) 0.167
Q25: lnk80=8.41 0.022 (0.051) 0.672
Q50: lnk80=9.75 0.097 (0.045) 0.035
Q75: lnk80=10.91 0.161 (0.057) 0.006
max: lnk80=11.95 0.219 (0.076) 0.005
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are the calculated eﬀect from Regression 3 of Table 5 of the combined linear
and interaction terms, estimated at the values of capital per worker given in the ﬁrst column (minimum,
maximum, and quartiles), given that primary exports and skill are at their mean values (0.147 and 0.668
respectively). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
between trade barriers and growth. In this paper, we argue that the reason for such dis-
appointing results is that, theoretically, no such unambiguous relationship exists. Rather,
as a quick study of the endogenous growth literature shows, the impact of trade barriers
on growth depends on how trade reallocates resources through the economy. Thus, in both
Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Matsuyama (1992), whether trade has a positive or
negative impact depends on the pattern of comparative advantage in the country being
analyzed.
By allowing the overall eﬀect of trade barriers on growth to diﬀer across countries based
on the pattern of comparative advantage, we ﬁnd that tariﬀ barriers are most strongly and
positively correlated with growth in capital-abundant countries. This contingent relation-
ship is in line with the predictions of Grossman and Helpman (1990), and is shown to be
robust to multiple alternative speciﬁcations.
Appendix: Data Description and Sources
The following set of 94 countries are used in our regressions reported in Table 1. The data
on primary exports are not available for Botswana, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Indonesia, Israel,
Lesotho, Nepal, and Zaire; consequently, we use the remaining 85 observations in estimating
equation (2).
• North Africa and Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia.
• Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cote
D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
16Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
y growth 0.008 0.019 -0.036 0.055
TFP growth 0.001 0.021 -0.054 0.053
tariﬀs (τ) 0.119 0.081 0.000 0.362
skill0 0.147 0.156 0.003 0.769
lnk0 9.642 1.518 5.081 11.95
pexp0 0.668 0.279 0.040 1.000
lny0 9.259 1.039 6.849 10.74
Inv/GDP 0.164 0.078 0.020 0.450
lnh0 0.382 0.250 0.031 1.012
Pop growth 0.019 0.011 0.001 0.037
Openness 0.617 0.440 0.142 3.711
Notes: Descriptive statistics are for the sample of 85 countries in most of the empirical analysis, such as Tables 3
and 5.
Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
• America: Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, USA, and Venezuela.
• East & South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pak-
istan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
• Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
• Oceania: Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea.
The following list deﬁnes variables used in the tables, indicates their sources, and explains
how we construct them, where relevant. Table A.1 reports the descriptive statistics.
• y : GDP per worker. The data on output and labor supply are from Penn World
Tables v.6.1 (PWT6.1). For Cyprus, Singapore, and Sierra Leone, output data are
not available for the most recent years. Consequently, in calculating the average
annual growth rates of these countries, the ﬁnal is the most recent year for which the
data is available.
• k : Capital per worker. Using the investment series data from PWT6.1, capital stock
data are constructed with standard perpetual inventory method with 6 percent de-
17preciation rate. Following Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (1997), the initial level of the
capital stock for each country is estimated as K60/Y60 = (I/Y )/(g + δ + n), where
I/Y is the average investment rate in physical capital over 1960–85, g = 0.02 (an
estimate of the global average growth rate of Y/L), δ = 0.06 is the depreciation rate,
and n is the average growth rate of the country’s labor supply. The results are not
sensitive to using alternative initial estimates of capital stocks.
• h : Average human capital per worker, estimated as in the main text. The data
on average years of schooling are taken from Barro and Lee (2002). Educational
attainment data are not complete for Burkina Faso, Comoros, Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia,
and Morocco. For these countries, we use data from countries with similar educational
levels, following Nunn and Treﬂer (2009). For example, for Burkina Faso, we use the
average of the educational attainment data from Ghana and Mali; for Morocco, we
use the average of the data from Algeria and Tunisia.
• TFP: Given the data on output, capital, labor, and average human capital, we obtain
TFP series directly from equation (1).
• τ : Import-weighted average tariﬀ (i.e., tariﬀs/imports), 1975-90, from World Devel-
opment Indicators.
• skill: Fraction of population aged 25 and above with at least a secondary degree, from
Barro and Lee (2002).
• pexp: Primary Exports/Total Exports, from World Development Indicators.
• Inv/GDP: Investment/GDP, 1975–90, from PWT6.1.
• Pop. Growth: Average annual population growth rate, 1975–90, from PWT6.1.
• Openness: (Imports+Exports)/GDP, 1975–90, from PWT6.1.
18• Geography: Four geographic variables from Sachs and Warner (1995). Three are
dummy variables indicating that the country is in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America,
or is landlocked. The fourth measures the fraction of land located in a tropical climate.
• Governance: Six measures of the quality of governance from Kaufmann et al. (2008):
voice and accountability, political stability, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory qual-
ity, rule of law, and control of corruption. These six governance indicators are mea-
sured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to
better governance outcomes. Unfortunately, the data are available only for recent
years (1996–2007); in our analysis, we use the average value of each indicator between
1996 and 2000.
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